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Abstract This paper explores how pension reforms in countries with PAYG schemes
affect countries with funded systems. We use a two-country two-period overlapping-
generations model, where the countries only differ in their pension systems. We dis-
tinguish between the case where a reform potentially leads to a Pareto improvement
in the PAYG country, and where this is impossible. In the latter case, the funded
country shares both in the costs and the benefits of the reform. However, if a Pareto-
improving pension reform is feasible in the PAYG country, a Pareto improvement in
the funded country is not guaranteed.
Keywords International spillover effects · Pension reform
JEL Classification F21 · F41 · F47 · H55 · H63
1 Introduction
In many developed countries, aging has led to a debate on reforming unfunded pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) social-security systems. One of the most discussed reform pro-
posals is to switch to a more funded pension system where people save for their own
pensions, and realize a higher expected rate of return on their contributions (see, for
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example, Feldstein 2005 and Bovenberg 2003). Many countries with PAYG-financed
pension schemes actually (are planning to) implement such pension reforms. In a
multicountry world with integrated capital markets, such a switch to funding will en-
gender spillover effects to other countries. The aim of this paper is to look at these
international spillover effects of pension reform. More specifically, we will analyze
how countries with funded pension systems are affected when countries with PAYG
pension schemes reform their pension system.
Some papers (e.g., Fehr et al. 2005; Börsch-Supan et al. 2006 and INGENUE
2001) that address pension reform issues in an open-economy framework develop
large multi-country overlapping-generation models to study the effects of pension
reform. These large-scale general equilibrium models are particularly useful in case
one wants to obtain reliable forecasts on several key economic variables. An impor-
tant drawback of these models is, however, that analytical solutions are not feasible
and the underlying mechanisms of the results are not clear. We use a simple two-
country two-period overlapping-generations model with an integrated capital market,
where one country has a PAYG pension system and the other country has a fully
funded retirement scheme. By keeping the model this simple, we are able to derive
an analytical solution for the transition path of the common capital–labor ratio, and
to derive the spillover effects of pension reform.1
In analyzing the effects of a pension reform in the PAYG country, we first assume
that collecting contributions in the PAYG country does not involve any distortions. It
is well known that in such a case, the PAYG system is Pareto efficient, see Verbon
(1989) and Breyer (1989).2 This means that if some generations are allowed to gain
from the conversion policy, it is unavoidable that other generations incur a loss. So, in
the reforming country, a choice has to be made which generations are allowed to gain
from the reform and which not. In general, future generations in the PAYG country
gain if the reform implies an increase in the capital–labor ratio, the reason being that
the PAYG country is a borrower on the common capital market and, therefore, gains
both from the lower interest rate that goes along with an increase in the capital–labor
ratio and from the higher wages. As the funded country is a lender on the common
capital market, the increasing capital–labor ratio does not necessarily imply welfare
gains for future generations in the funded country. However, we can show that under
plausible parameter configurations the reforming country’s choice spills positively
over to the funded country in a common capital market. In particular, if the reforming
country decides that future generations will gain from the reform, future generations
in the non-reforming country will gain as well. But just like in the reforming country,
this long-run welfare gain may come at the cost of lower utility in the short run as,
due to the rising capital–labor ratio, the increase in wages for initial generations is
relatively small compared to the decrease in the interest rate.
1Other papers that study the open economy aspects of pension schemes using smaller models are, for
example, Pestieau et al. (2006), who consider the issue of the optimal PAYG scheme in a setting where
the number of symmetric countries changes, and Bräuninger (1999), who focuses on the optimal degree of
social security funding in a two-country framework. We, however, abstract from optimality issues.
2Actually, we already know from the classic papers of Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973) that if the
economy is dynamically efficient no intergenerational redistribution can be Pareto improving.
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We then proceed by assuming excess burdens in tax collection. It has been shown
that in that case a Pareto-improving pension reform is possible in a closed economy
(Homburg 1990). The idea is that if the contribution rate is decreased net welfare
gains result which make it possible to compensate the elderly for the loss of their
benefits. When a Pareto-improving policy is implemented in our two-country world,
the long-run gains in the PAYG country are again transferred to the funded country.
However, although in the PAYG country, the policy is carefully shaped such that no
generation loses in both the short run and the long run, in the funded country some
generations might lose in the short run. The reason for this is that in the open capital
market the additional savings that emerge during the conversion policy in the PAYG
country will depress the interest rate, which especially harms the generations that are
alive in the funded country when the PAYG country starts the conversion policy. As
these generations do not, or do not fully, receive the gains that result from increasing
wages, they are not compensated for the negative utility effects of the lower interest
rate.
In principle, replacing a PAYG-financed public pension scheme by a funded pen-
sion scheme implies that pension claims of the current retired are no longer honored.
In this respect, the switch to funding is comparable to imposing a lump-sum tax on
the current old generations in order to decrease the size of the government debt. Ex-
actly the reverse of this policy scenario, i.e., granting a lump-sum tax decrease to
older generations financed by increasing the government debt was already analyzed
by Diamond (1965) in a one-country model and by Persson (1985) in a two-country
model.3 Based on this similarity, our paper can be seen as a merger between the pen-
sion reform literature, where international spillover effects received relatively little
attention, and the literature on the effects of government debt, where the interna-
tional externalities did not remain unnoticed. Some of our results are closely linked
to the conclusions of Persson (1985). For example, the spillover effects of reforming
a Pareto-efficient PAYG scheme without compensating the initial generation of el-
derly are qualitatively the same as those of a decrease in government debt: both lead
to a decrease in the interest rate on the international capital market. However, other
reform scenarios that we discuss, and especially the Pareto-improving reform, do not
fit into Persson’s set up and, therefore, extend his analysis.
Steigum and Raffelhüschen (1994) find in a calibrated two-country model, with
North America and the rest of the OECD taken as the two countries of interest, that
the welfare effects of debt changes in one country are relatively minor. The reason
for this result is that the change in debt in one country is small compared to the
total capital stock in the common capital market.4 We allow for differences in the
3Other papers that analyze public debt in an international setting are, for example, Fried and Howitt (1988)
and Homburg and Richter (1993). These papers use models based on assumptions that essentially differ
from ours: The former abstracts from capital accumulation and examines the effect of government debt on
capital gains and losses; the latter analyzes the problem of harmonizing debt and public pension schemes
when labor is perfectly mobile.
4Another reason is that Steigum and Raffelhüschen (1994) assume endogenous labor supply. In our setting,
this would imply that a tax decrease, due to pension reform, stimulates labor supply which dampens the
savings, and thereby the general-equilibrium effect of the reform. Empirical estimates of labor-supply
elasticities for the principal earner of a household, however, generate relatively low values, see Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999) for an overview.
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Table 1 Composition of retirement incomes in 2003 (%)
First pillar Second pillar Third pillar
Greece 98 1.5 0.5
France 97 1.5 1.5
Spain 97 1.5 1.5
Italy 96 2 2
Austria 95 3 2
Germany 94 4 2
Denmark 76 20 4
Sweden 75 20 5
Switzerland 72 26 2
Netherlands 56 37 7
Source: Boeri et al. (2006)
size of the two countries by introducing a parameter that measures the relative size
of the funded country. The analysis presented in this paper can then be applied to
the case where a group of countries shifts to more funded pensions, while a small
number of countries do not reform their pension system. An interesting example of
this can be observed in the EU where, broadly speaking, two groups of countries
can be distinguished: a large group of countries with extensive PAYG schemes, but
almost no funded pensions, and a much smaller group of countries having sizeable
funded pensions (see Table 1). Many of the countries in the first group are discussing
(or have already started) a transition to more funded pensions. This reform will lead
to sizeable changes in the capital stock in the long run, irrespective of whether the
reform is gradually implemented or not and, therefore, have important consequences
for the countries that already have more elaborate funded pension schemes, especially
because this group of countries is small compared to the group of reforming countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark
model and shows how the pension reform is modeled. In Sect. 3, we analyze differ-
ent types of reform scenarios under the assumption that the PAYG scheme is Pareto
efficient, while Sect. 4 considers the effects in case the reform is Pareto improving in
the PAYG country. In these sections, we illustrate the effects of the reform by numer-
ical simulation examples using Cobb–Douglas specifications. Analytical derivations
of the results using more general utility and production functions are presented in the
Appendix. The paper winds up with a concluding section.
2 The model
We will use a two-period overlapping-generations model of an open economy. Fol-
lowing Buiter (1981) and Persson (1985), the world consists of two countries, coun-
try P and country F . Countries differ in the way the pensions are financed. Country
P uses a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and country F has a fully funded retire-
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ment scheme. We assume a constant population size5 and dynamic efficiency in both
countries. Countries may, however, differ in population size. In this way, we allow for
scale differences between the two countries. When we define LF
LP
= ν and normalize
LP to 1, then ν tells us the relative size of LF . The countries are identical in all other
respects.
2.1 Production
Production per young individual is described by a standard neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale production function, f (kit ), where kit stands for the amount of cap-
ital per young individual in period t, in country i, i = P, F . Perfect competi-
tion among producers gives the usual equilibrium conditions, rit = f ′(kit ) − δ and
wit = f (kit ) − kit f ′(kit ), where rit is the interest rate, wit denotes the real wage, and
δ is the depreciation rate of capital. There is perfect capital mobility between the
two countries, but labor is immobile. Since capital can freely move across countries,
the interest rates will be equalized, i.e., rPt = rFt = rt , ∀t . And because both coun-
tries are endowed with the same production technology, we have kPt = kFt = kt , and
consequently, wPt = wFt = wt .
2.2 Modelling pensions and reform
Initially, the government in country P runs a balanced PAYG pension system, that is,
taxes of the young (τPt ) are used to finance the pension benefits of the elderly (zPt ).
As explained in the Introduction, we distinguish between the case where the PAYG
system is efficient and the case where the PAYG scheme leads to distortions in the
economy. In the latter case, the PAYG tax implies an excess burden. This has been
modeled in various ways in the literature. Homburg (1990) and Breyer and Straub
(1993) assume that taxes distort the labor-leisure decision so that a decrease in the
contribution rate for the PAYG system will increase labor supply and, therefore, re-
strict the loss in revenue for financing the pension benefits.6 Pemberton (2000), how-
ever, considers the case where a conversion policy goes along with an income tax
being replaced by a consumption tax. Then young individuals under the conversion
policy have an incentive to save more than under the income tax, which provides
the means to compensate the older generations when the PAYG system is abolished.
5This assumption may look strange as pension reform issues are often discussed in the context of popu-
lation aging. In this paper, however, we focus on the international spillover effects of pension reform. In
another paper, i.e., Adema et al. (2008), we discuss the spillovers of pensions under aging.
6It should be noted here that the existence of excess burdens in taxation cannot be the prime motive for
converting the PAYG system into a fully funded system. The excess burden arises because the individual
link between pension benefits and contributions is broken. The reason for this is that the pension system is
also used for intragenerational redistribution. As proved by Fenge (1995) and Brunner (1996), in a PAYG
system in which such a link exists, the system is Pareto efficient, even if contributions are a proportional
tax on labor income. Such PAYG systems exist. For instance, as noted by Sinn (2000), Germany has had
a PAYG system since 1957 where benefits are proportional to contributions, and so a Pareto improving
transition to a funded system is not possible in Germany. Sinn (2000) and Belan and Pestieau (1999) give
overviews of the issue. Their conclusion in the words of the last authors is that “reduced distortions can be
achieved without privatization”.
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Analogously, Belan et al. (1998) offer the first generation a subsidy on the return on
their savings. Yet another way of modeling can be found in Köthenbürger and Pout-
vaara (2006) who assume that a decrease of taxation goes along with an increase in
the value of a fixed factor.
Instead of explicitly specifying how behavior is affected when the excess burden
of the premium contributions is lifted, we assume that the tax base is constant and
independent of the size of the contribution. The existence of an excess burden under
the PAYG system is modeled by assuming a so-called “iceberg” formulation of tax
distortions (as in, e.g., Casamatta et al. 2000 and Perotti 2001), that is, for a given
tax imposed on young individuals, only τPt − (τPt )2 can be redistributed, so (τPt )2
is “wasted.” For a tax on elderly individuals, however, such a waste does not occur.
This specification of the excess burden of the tax is a short cut for the labor-supply
interpretation. Regarding this interpretation, it should be the case, as we assume, that
taxing the young leads to tax revenue losses if the young curtail their labor-supply
efforts as a result of the tax. But when the elderly are retired, taxes cannot have an
effect on their labour-supply behavior, and so there is no excess burden.7
In general, in the initial steady state, the pension benefit of an old individual is
equal to:8
zP = τP − ξ(τP )2 (1)
where ξ = 1 implies that the PAYG tax leads to an excess burden, and where ξ = 0
refers to the situation where the financing of the PAYG scheme is not distortionary.
For the moment, we develop the model in the absence of distortions so that ξ = 0 and
zP = τP in the initial steady state. In Sect. 4, we consider the case where ξ = 1.
At t = −1, the government in country P announces that it will reform its pension
system in the next period (t = 0). Individuals take the economic consequences of the
reform into account when they make their optimizing decisions in period t = −1.
A pension reform leads to a lower contribution level and lower benefits. We model
this as follows:
τPt = μtτP (2)
zPt = λtτP (3)
where μt < 1 and λt ≤ 1.
One of the crucial issues in pension reform is whether or not the (partial or com-
plete) switch to funding is accompanied by a compensation for the older generations.
We consider both possibilities. In the first case, there is no compensation: benefits and
contributions simultaneously decrease by the same amount. The elderly individuals
at the time of the reform lose as a consequence, while the current and future young
individuals fully gain from the higher rate of return on their contributions under the
funded system.
7The tax on the elderly can be seen, for example, as a short-cut for a tax on old-age consumption that is
nondistortionary.
8By omitting time subscripts, we denote the initial steady state value of the respective variable.
676 Y. Adema et al.
In the second case, the elderly are compensated, implying that μt < λt will hold
during the initial periods of the reform. We assume that public debt, (bPt ), is used
to finance the shortfall in contributions. It is assumed that the government issues
one-period debt, which yields the same rate of interest as capital. At a later stage,
additional contributions (τBt ) are raised to finance the interest obligations on the debt,
so as to keep debt per worker constant. With debt, therefore, the budget constraint of
the government (public debt dynamics) in per capita terms is:
bPt+1 = (1 + rt )bPt + zPt − τPt − τBt (4)
If part of the benefits are financed by government debt, we assume that at a cer-
tain point in time benefits match contributions again, i.e., the benefits should have
decreased as: λt = μt < 1. So the PAYG system is balanced again, but at a perma-
nently lower level. At the moment that contributions and benefits are equal again,
the government introduces τBt , such that debt per worker is stabilized from then on.
Furthermore, we assume that there is no government debt in the initial steady state
(bP = 0), so that τB is zero too.
In country F, the government invests the contributions of the young and returns
them with interest in the next period in the form of transfers to the then old agents. The
funded scheme has fixed contributions, which implies that the system is actuarially
fair for every individual and contributions to the pension scheme are exactly offset by
an equal reduction in private savings. This means that the funded pension system is
neutral and the economy behaves in exactly the same way as if there were no pension
scheme. Therefore, we do not distinguish between contributions to the funded pen-
sion scheme and private savings, that is, pension contributions are included in total
savings sFt .
2.3 Households
Lifetime utility of a representative individual born at t is given by the following sep-
arable utility function:9
U
(
c
y,i
t , c
o,i
t+1
) = u(cy,it
) + 1
1 + ρ v
(
c
o,i
t+1
)
(i = P,F ) (5)
where ρ > 0 stands for the (constant) pure rate of time preference of an individual,
c
y,i
t is consumption when young, and c
o,i
t+1 is consumption in the second period of
life.
Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labor. The budget constraints in the
PAYG country are as follows:
c
y,P
t = wt − τPt − sPt (6a)
c
o,P
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)sPt + zPt+1 − τBt+1 (6b)
9We assume that the felicity functions u(cy,it ) and v(c
o,i
t+1) satisfy the Inada conditions.
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c
y,P
t = wt − τPt − τBt − sPt (7a)
c
o,P
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)sPt + zPt+1 (7b)
The government in country P can either levy the additional tax to stabilize gov-
ernment debt (τBt ) on the elderly (6b) or on the working people (7a). The budget
constraints for the funded country are same, except that τPt = τBt = zPt+1 = 0.
Maximizing lifetime utility subject to the budget constraints gives the following
expression for individual optimal consumption in both countries:
u′
(
c
y,i
t
) = 1 + rt+1
1 + ρ v
′(co,it+1
)
(i = P,F ) (8)
where u′(cy,it ) = du(c
y,i
t )
dcy,it
is the marginal utility of young-age consumption, and
v′(co,it+1) = dv(c
o,i
t )
dco,it
is the marginal utility of old-age consumption. For future refer-
ence, we define the elasticity σ it ≡ − v
′(co,it )
c
o,i
t v
′′(co,it )
, i = F,P with v′′(co,it ) the second-
order derivative of felicity when old. The value of these elasticities in the steady state
is important for the effects of a reform. In particular, we exclude extremely low values
of σ as these imply large increases in savings in reaction to a decrease in the interest
rate.
2.4 Equilibrium international capital market
We assume that the two countries have a common capital market, i.e., capital is per-
fectly mobile. In this respect, our paper differs from Casarico (2001), who analyzes
the effects of the integration of capital markets of two countries that differ in the
degree of funding of their pension systems.10
Individuals invest their savings either in the home country or abroad. Their port-
folios will be composed such that interest rates are equalized. Equilibrium in the
international capital market is given by:
sPt + νsFt = (1 + ν)kt+1 + bPt+1 (9)
As old-age consumption in country P is partly financed by a transfer from the young,
while in country F old-age consumption has to be completely financed by own sav-
ings, the latter country has higher savings than country P , implying that country F
exports capital abroad.
10Casarico (2001) also shortly touches upon the issue of pension reform in an open economy. We, however,
consider different pension reform scenarios, derive the full dynamic path for the capital–labor ratio, show
simulation graphs to clarify the mechanisms of the model further, and distinguish between the case where
PAYG contributions are distorting and the case where the PAYG taxes do not lead to distortions.
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3 Pension reform under Pareto efficiency
This section investigates the spillover effects of a pension reform in the PAYG coun-
try, under the assumption that the PAYG system is Pareto efficient, i.e., taxes are
nondistortionary. This means that there is a trade-off between the utility of different
generations in implementing the reform. We consider three different types of reforms.
In the first reform, the government in the PAYG country does not compensate the el-
derly at the time of the reform (Sect. 3.1). In the second and third reform, we analyze
the effects in case the government fully compensates the current old (Sect. 3.2). In
that case, government debt is created and the extra tax needed to pay the interest
obligations on the debt can either be levied on the pensioners or on the workers.
For all cases considered, we are able to calculate analytically the effect of a pen-
sion reform on the common capital stock. We employ the method of comparative
dynamics, adopted from (Judd 1982). The processes for μt and λt are given by:
μt = 1 + πgt (10)
λt = 1 + πft (11)
where gt < 0 and ft ≤ 0 describe the time pattern of a perturbation of μt and λt
from their steady-state values and π reflects the magnitude of this perturbation. The
effects of a pension reform can be traced by linearizing the capital-accumulation (9)
with respect to π around the initial steady state. The resulting first-order difference
equations for kt describe the capital–labor ratio changes over time and the determin-
ing factors. Moreover, we produce numerical simulations in order to illustrate the
mechanics of the model. The qualitative results of these simulations are robust for
changes in the adopted values of the parameters.11
3.1 No compensation for the current old
At t = −1, the government announces that it will decrease both the contributions to
the PAYG system (τPt ) and the pension benefits (zPt ) permanently in the next period
(t = 0).12 So, the old at t = 0 bear all the costs of the reform.
The change in the capital–labor ratio To analyze the international spillover effects,
we compare the effects of reform when the two economies have a joint capital market
(indicated by superscript PF ) to the situation where the two economies are closed
(indicated by superscripts P and F , respectively). Obviously, in country F, nothing
happens when it is a closed economy, as there is no need for reform.
11We derived numerically the nonlinear transition path, and compared the numerical results with those
found with the method of comparative dynamics. The accuracy of the linearized path was quite satisfactory
with a relative error of one percent at most. This is in line with the findings by Meijdam and Verhoeven
(1998). They conclude that using comparative dynamics in a dynamic model is just as accurate as using
comparative statics in a static model.
12This means that g0 = g1 = · · · = g∞ < 0 and ft = gt < 0. This could either be a full privatization
(gt = ft = −1) or a partial privatization (−1 < gt = ft < 0).
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Using the method described above, we obtain the following first-order difference
equation for the evolution of the capital–labor ratio when the two economies have a
joint capital market:13
∂kPFt+1
∂π
= [
1
αP
− 1 + ν( 1
αF
− 1)]kf ′′(k)
Δ
∂kPFt
∂π
+ (
1
αP
− 1)τP
Δ
gt
− τ
P
αP Δ(1 + r)ft+1 (12)
with Δ ≡ 1 + ν +f ′′(k)(βP
αP
+ ν βF
αF
), and αi ≡ 1 + 1+ρ
(1+r)2
u′′(cy,i )
v′′(co,i ) > 1, i = F,P . Note
that 1
αi
< 1 can be interpreted as the propensity to consume out of lifetime income
when young (for a given interest rate). The β’s indicate the effect of a change in
the interest rate on consumption when young (and thus on savings) and are defined
as βF ≡ (1−σF )co,F
(1+r)2 , β
P ≡ (1−σP )co,P −zP
(1+r)2 . Note that in case of logarithmic utility
functions αi = 2+ρ1+ρ , βF = 0 and βP = −z
P
(1+r)2 , i = P,F . The first-order difference
equation for country P when it is closed is given by:
∂kPt+1
∂π
= [
1
αP
− 1]kf ′′(k)
ΔP
∂kPt
∂π
+ (
1
αP
− 1)τP
ΔP
gt − τ
P
αP ΔP (1 + r)ft+1 (13)
with ΔP ≡ 1+f ′′(k)βP
αP
. We assume14 0 < ΔP < Δ. By comparing the capital–labor
ratio changes in the closed-economies case (13) with the change in the capital–labor
ratio when the two countries have integrated capital markets (12), we derive the pure
spillover effects of pension reform in a common capital market.15
At the time of the announcement (t = −1), young individuals living in country P
increase their savings because they know they will receive a lower pension benefit,
i.e., f0 < 0. As a result, the reform leads to a positive change in the capital–labor
ratio at t = 0, as ∂kPF0
∂π
= −τP
αP Δ(1+r)f0 > 0 (12). Note that (given that Δ > ΔP ) this
effect is larger in case of a closed economy (see (13)). The increase in the common
capital–labor ratio at t = 0 leads to higher wages, which engenders higher savings in
both countries. Due to these higher savings, the capital–labor ratio continues to rise
(the first term in (12) > 0). Citizens in the PAYG country have an additional incentive
to save more because as of t = 0, contributions to the PAYG system fall (second term
in (12) > 0), and they will receive lower benefits. So, we have the general result
(see also Fig. 1 where we show the change in the capital–labor ratio for the different
cases):16
13In Appendix A.1, we show the derivation of this expression.
14In case of logarithmic utility, this condition always holds. For the more general case, this condition holds
for a wide range of parameter values.
15To exclude the effects of integration, it is assumed that the initial steady state is the same in all cases.
16The graphs are based on simulations with logarithmic utility functions and countries of equal size
(ν = 1). The initial value of the tax rate is 0.2. It is assumed that half of the PAYG system is privatized,
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Fig. 1 Change in kt
Result 1 In case the elderly are not compensated at the time of a given pension
reform, the capital–labor ratio in country P increases less in case it has a common
capital market with a funded country compared to the case where it is closed, as part
of the extra savings flow to country F .
In Fig. 1, the two economies have the same size (ν = 1).17 However, as most EU
countries mainly use PAYG pension schemes, the group of countries that has size-
able funded pensions can be considered as relatively small. If the group of funded
countries is relatively small (i.e., ν < 1) and a large group of countries with exten-
sive PAYG schemes reform their pension system, the spillover effects for the funded
countries will be larger. For the PAYG countries, however, it holds that the larger they
are relative to the funded countries, the more the effects of the reform resemble the
effects of a closed economy.
The change in consumption and utility When we know the change in the capital–
labor ratio, we can derive the changes in all other variables. The analytical derivations
are presented in Appendix A.2 for the consumption and utility effects in country F .
Here, we only show simulation graphs. The change in consumption when young and
old in the two countries is displayed in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. The spillover
effects for consumption are summarized in the following results:
that is, from t = 1 onwards, both the contributions and the benefits fall by 50% permanently. The results
do not qualitatively change when the PAYG system is totally privatized, however. Moreover, we used the
following production function, f (kt ) = k0.3t . Capital depreciates at 5% per year, and assuming that one
period is 30 years, this means that δ = 1 − (0.95)30 = 0.7854. Agents are relatively patient with a time
preference of 1.2% per year, so that ρ = (1.012)30 − 1 = 0.4303.
17In the steady state k = 0.13, which implies that the capital–labor ratio rises by about 17% in the open
economy case.
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Fig. 2 Change in cy,it
Fig. 3 Change in co,it
Result 2 In case there is no compensation for the current old:
(a) The reform in country P implies an increasing capital–labor ratio and higher
wages, which enhances the consumption possibilities for the young in coun-
try F .18
(b) The fall in the interest rate, however, lowers the return of the savings of old people
living in country F , which has a negative effect on their consumption. Savings in
country F do not rise sufficiently to offset the negative effects of the lower interest
rate in the long run, so that the consumption of the elderly in the non-reforming
country decreases due to the reform.19
18This is the case if βF < k, see Appendix A.2 for details.
19As shown in Appendix A.2, this result holds if sF > σ
F (αF −1)(1+r)(k−βF )
αF
.
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The changes in lifetime utility are shown in Fig. 4, lifetime utility rises in the long
run. However, this type of pension reform, in which benefits are decreased without
compensation, will obviously hurt the elderly in country P at the time of the reform.
It is, however, interesting to note that this loss spills over to the elderly in country F
as well. In particular, we have:20
Result 3 In case the current elderly in country P are not compensated, the genera-
tion in country F born at the time of the reform (t = 0) may experience a loss, while
this is not the case for the same generation in country P . Later generations in coun-
try F gain from the pension reform in country P , but the consumption gap between
young and old people has increased.
The latter result is noteworthy. An important motive for introducing a reform is to
get higher rates of return on pension contributions and, as a result, a higher retirement
income. In the funded country, however, the result is just the opposite: the pensioners
in the funded country will achieve lower incomes than if the PAYG country had not
implemented a reform. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that the higher
savings in the PAYG country, generated by the reform, lead to a fall in the interest
rate and, therefore, lower returns on the pension contributions paid in the funded
country.
20As shown in Appendix A.2 utility in the funded country rises in the long run if sF < k(1 + r). Fig-
ure 13 in Appendix A.2 shows that this condition holds for a wide range of parameter values. The utility
in the funded country decreases initially if the positive wage effect when young is outweighed by the neg-
ative effect on the interest rate (which may be relatively large because k increases over time) when old.
The condition for this is sF > k(1+r)
αP (1+r)−r+[ 1
αP
−1+ν( 1
αF
−1)]kf ′′/Δ . This condition holds as long as the
production elasticity of capital is not too large (≤0.5).
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3.2 Compensation
In the pension reform described in the previous section, the current elderly bear all
the costs of the reform. It is probably more realistic to assume that the government
compensates the current old, so that individuals have more time to adjust their be-
havior to the smaller PAYG system. Political economy arguments could also play a
role for implementing such a reform policy. Cooley and Soares (1999), for example,
argue that privatizing a PAYG system is only politically feasible in case a transition
policy uses debt to finance the benefits during the transition period, shifting at least
part of the cost to future generations. Therefore, in this and the next subsection, we
assume that while contributions to the PAYG scheme fall permanently at t = 0, ben-
efits are kept constant in that period. This is again communicated one period before
the reform actually takes place (at t = −1). The government also announces that at
t = 1 pension benefits will fall as much as the contributions, so that the PAYG system
is balanced again from then on.21 Since taxes are lower than the benefits during one
period (t = 0), there will be government debt in country P at t = 1. At the moment
that contributions and benefits are equal again (t = 1), the government introduces an
extra tax (τBt ) to pay the interest obligations on its debt, such that debt per worker is
stabilized from then on. This extra tax can either be levied on the working people or
on the elderly.
Tax levied on the future old When τBt is levied on the elderly, starting at t = 1, the
pension reform is Pareto neutral, that is, there is no generation that gains or loses from
the pension reform. The reason for this result is that savings in the PAYG country
increase just as much as government debt increases. All that has happened is that the
implicit debt inherent to the PAYG system has been made explicit. This is a standard
result in the pension reform literature, see, for example, Verbon (1989), Breyer (1989)
and Homburg (1990). So, we have:22
Result 4 In case the old at the time of the reform are fully compensated and the
tax to finance the debt is levied on the future elderly, the capital–labor ratio remains
constant over time.
A constant capital–labor ratio implies that consumption and utility also do not
change. Moreover, there are no international spillover effects for the funded country.
Tax levied on the future young Instead of imposing τBt on the elderly, the govern-
ment can also levy the tax on the working people, starting at t = 1. So, the first young
generation under the reform, born at t = 0, does not have to pay the debt tax, i.e.,
τB0 = 0, as bP0 = 0. Like the future young generations, they get the lower PAYG tax,
but unlike the future young generations, they do not have to contribute to the com-
21This means that g0 = g1 = · · · = g∞ < 0 and f0 = 0, ft = gt < 0 for t > 0.
22More information and a formal proof of this result can be found in Appendix B.1.
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pensation the elderly at t = 0 receive. The young generation at t = 0, therefore, will
get a windfall gain.23 This gives the following result:24
Result 5 In case there is full compensation for the elderly at the time of the reform
and the debt tax is levied on the future workers, the capital–labor ratio will start
decreasing in the period after the reform in country P . This in turn leads to capital
flows from country F to country P .
The intuition for this result is obvious. The first young generation under the reform
consumes part of its gain in the first period, and saves part of it. As the gain this
generation receives equals the created debt, the increase in savings at t = 0 is lower
than the created debt. In other words, the public debt crowds out part of the capital
stock.
Future working generations get the lower PAYG tax, but also pay a debt tax τBt .
Moreover, they inherit a lower capital–labor ratio, which leads to lower wages. There-
fore, savings are lower and, as a result, the capital–labor ratio continues to decline.
Because country P can finance part of its government debt with savings of country F ,
the capital–labor ratio falls more when country P does not have an integrated capital
market with country F . This can be seen in Fig. 5.
Notice that the results of this reform are exactly the opposite of the pension reform
described in Sect. 3.1: the capital–labor ratio falls over time instead of rises. This
implies that the effect on the other endogenous variables is also reversed. Actually,
all simulation graphs are almost the mirror images of those of the pension reform in
Sect. 3.1, the peaks are only one period later, because young individuals in the PAYG
23The government in the PAYG country may decide to implement the pension reform in this way for
political economy reasons. For example, when it is assumed, as in Cooley and Soares (1999), that a reform
is only implementable in case it is welfare-improving for a majority of the current population.
24More details and a formal proof of this result are given in Appendix B.2.
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country do not adjust their behavior at t = −1. The main findings are as follows (see
also Figs. 6, 7, 8):25
Result 6 In case the elderly are fully compensated at the time of the reform and the
tax to finance the debt is levied on the future workers:
(a) The pension reform in country P leads to less consumption possibilities for the
young in country F , while the elderly in this country gain.
(b) In the period after the reform both the elderly and the working people in the
funded country gain from the pension reform in the PAYG country. In the long
run, however, people in the funded country experience negative spillover effects.
So, the fact that they have a common capital market with country F protects the
generations living in country P to some extent, as part of the burden of this reform
policy is transmitted to country F via the capital market.26
3.3 Concluding remarks
In general, we conclude the following: In case the PAYG system is Pareto efficient
and the government in the PAYG country implements a reform that leads to losses for
at least one generation, these losses will be transmitted to the funded country via the
capital market. It should be noted that the pension reforms analyzed in this section
are extreme, in the sense that no compensation at all or full compensation is granted
at the time of the reform. Of course, it is possible to have pension reforms where the
25The analytical framework of Appendix A.2 still applies, as all the expressions for the change in con-
sumption and utility are expressed as a function of the capital–labor ratio.
26Of course, the government in the PAYG country could decide to stabilize the debt and levy τBt in a later
period, so that even more generations get a windfall gain. Government debt would crowd out a larger part
of the capital stock and the long-term losses would be larger. However, our central result that the funded
country shares in the gains and losses of the reform in the PAYG country would not change.
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elderly are partly compensated. However, such scenarios will not change the general
conclusion from our analysis that a reform policy in one country unavoidably spills
over to other countries.
4 Pareto-improving pension reform
In this section, we analyze the international spillover effects of a pension reform in the
PAYG country in case there is scope for a Pareto improvement, due to a distortionary
PAYG tax. As explained in Sect. 2.2, we model the excess burden as a (quadratic)
loss of tax revenue. This corresponds to ξ = 1 in (1), i.e., zP = τP − (τP )2, so (τPt )2
is wasted. We start from the Pareto neutral pension reform scenario of the previous
section. So, the government compensates the elderly at the time of the reform com-
pletely, and then from t = 1 onward imposes an extra tax on the pensioners to pay the
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interest obligations on the debt in order to keep debt per capita constant. The budget
constraint of the government (4) changes to:
bPt+1 = (1 + rt )bPt + zPt −
(
τPt −
(
τPt
)2) − τBt (14)
As argued earlier, we assume that the debt tax on the elderly, τBt , does not imply an
excess burden, given the labor-supply motivation for the excess burden. Now we can
state the following:27
Result 7 In case the PAYG tax implies an excess burden, a pension reform in the
PAYG country where the elderly are compensated and the debt tax is levied on the
pensioners leads to an increase in the capital–labor ratio in the period after the
reform. A higher capital–labor ratio in turn leads to higher wages and savings, so
that the capital–labor ratio continues to increase.
We also show this in Fig. 9. The intuition behind this result is that when PAYG
taxes induce an excess burden, abolishing (part of) the PAYG system leads to effi-
ciency gains, so that the capital–labor ratio actually rises, instead of staying constant
(as was the case in Result 4). It is then obvious that this reform leads to a Pareto
improvement in the PAYG country. This can indeed be seen in Fig. 12, all gener-
ations get a higher utility. In the funded country,28 however, only consumption of
the working people increases (see Fig. 10). The elderly in the nonreforming coun-
try get less consumption possibilities (see Fig. 11), mainly because the interest rate
decreases after an increase in kt . For the generation born at the time of the reform
consumption when young does not change, while they can consume less at their old-
age. This necessarily implies that this generation loses from the pension reform in the
27In Appendix C this is formally derived.
28Appendix A.2 shows the analytical framework for the change in consumption and utility.
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other country (see Fig. 12). All later generations in country F gain from the pension
reform in country P . So, we have the following main result:
Result 8 A Pareto-improving pension reform in country P does not necessarily lead
to a Pareto improvement in the funded country: the generation born at the time of the
reform is hurt by the pension reform in the PAYG country.
5 Concluding remarks
Currently, in many countries with an extensive pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financed pub-
lic pension system, reforms are considered to finance a larger part of the future pen-
sion benefits by accumulated funds. A central conclusion emerging from our paper
is that in a common capital market the effects of such a pension reform in a PAYG
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country spills over to countries with a fully funded pension system. In Europe, e.g.,
differences in financing methods of pension systems abound. For instance, countries
like Germany and Italy have extensive PAYG-financed parts in their pension sys-
tem, while in the UK and the Netherlands the larger part of the pension benefits are
financed out of accumulated assets. The message of our paper is that the latter coun-
tries cannot insulate themselves from the effects of reform measures in the former
countries. In the European pension debate, these spillover effects of pension reform
have not been an issue until, now, as far as we know. Yet, the consequences of pen-
sion reform in a PAYG country can be rather adverse for a funded country as we have
shown in this paper. Some key results illustrate this.
First, consider the case where the PAYG country compensates the elderly during
the transition phase, and the PAYG system is Pareto efficient. The introduction of
public debt, necessary to finance the compensation during the transition phase of the
reform, will lead to crowding out of the capital stock in both the PAYG and the funded
country, as soon as one generation is allowed to gain during the transition. As a result,
future generations in both types of countries will lose under this reform policy.
Second, if a PAYG country reforms its public pension system such that its own
future generations gain, then, although future generations in the funded country gain
as well, the distribution of consumption between young and old individuals at a cer-
tain time will change at the expense of old individuals. In the funded country the
elderly will even consume less in absolute amounts after the reform. Although the
deterioration of old-age consumption is the result of free choice by individuals in the
funded country, the resulting consumption allocation between young and old individ-
uals might not be desirable from a societal point of view.
Third, we have shown that if excess burdens in tax collection enable a Pareto-
improving pension reform in the PAYG country, during the transition phase some
initial generations in the funded country might suffer a loss under the reform nev-
ertheless. In other words, a reform policy that appears to be Pareto improving for
the PAYG country considered separately, does not have to be Pareto improving after
taking into account the international spillover effects.
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Obviously, our model has oversimplified the real world in many ways, and the
issue of spillover effects of pension reform merits further study in especially larger
and more applied models. Yet, we think that our central result, i.e., that pension re-
form in PAYG countries can have adverse effects on the welfare of some generations,
or some type of individuals in funded countries will remain to stand out in a more
general model. The obvious policy conclusion from our model is, therefore, that in
a common market like the EU, decisions on pension reform in the countries with a
large PAYG scheme cannot be taken without considering the effects for nonreform-
ing (funded) countries. In particular, dependent on the type and size of reform in the
PAYG countries, compensation for the nonreforming countries might be necessary.
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Appendix A
A.1 Derivation first-order difference equation kt+1
In this appendix, we derive the first-order difference equation for the evolution of the
capital–labor ratio given in (12). Linearising the capital-accumulation equation (9)
with respect to π around the initial steady state gives:
∂sPt
∂π
+ ν ∂s
F
t
∂π
= (1 + ν)∂kt+1
∂π
(15)
where we used the fact that ∂b
P
t+1
∂π
= 0 in case the current old are not compensated.
Then we derive expressions for ∂s
P
t
∂π
and ∂s
F
t
∂π
, using (6)–(8) and the fact that ∂τBt
∂π
= 0:
∂sPt
∂π
= α
P − 1
αP
[
∂wt
∂π
− ∂τ
P
t
∂π
]
− 1
αP
[
βP
∂rt+1
∂π
+ 1
1 + r
∂zPt+1
∂π
]
(16)
∂sFt
∂π
= α
F − 1
αF
∂wt
∂π
− 1
αF
βF
∂rt+1
∂π
(17)
where αi ≡1+ 1+ρ
(1+r)2
u′′(cy,i )
v′′(co,i ) > 1, i =F,P , βF ≡ (1−σ
F )co,F
(1+r)2 and β
P ≡ (1−σP )co,P −zP
(1+r)2 .
∂wt
∂π
and ∂rt+1
∂π
are given by:
∂wt
∂π
= −kf ′′(k)∂kt
∂π
(18)
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∂rt+1
∂π
= f ′′(k)∂kt+1
∂π
(19)
Combining (15)–(19) and simplifying gives:
∂kPFt+1
∂π
= [
1
αP
− 1 + ν( 1
αF
− 1)]kf ′′(k)
Δ
∂kPFt
∂π
+ (
1
αP
− 1)
Δ
∂τPt
∂π
− 1
αP Δ(1 + r)
∂zPt+1
∂π
(20)
with Δ ≡ 1 + ν + f ′′(k)(βP
αP
+ ν βF
αF
). Using (2)–(3) and (10)–(11), we know that:
∂τPt
∂π
= τP gt (21)
∂zPt+1
∂π
= τP ft+1 (22)
Substituting these two last expressions into (20) gives (12).
A.2 Derivation Results 2 and 3
In this appendix, we derive analytical expressions for the change in consumption
and utility in the funded country. From these equations, we can infer the relation-
ship between the change in the capital–labor ratio and consumption and utility. The
framework also applies to the pension reform scenarios discussed in Sects. 3.2 and 4.
Result 2a: Change in consumption when young Linearizing the first-period budget
constraint gives:
∂c
y,F
t
∂π
= 1
αF
[
βFf ′′(k)∂kt+1
∂π
− kf ′′(k)∂kt
∂π
]
(23)
The first term between the brackets shows the effect of the lower interest rate resulting
for the higher capital–labor ratio, which affects consumption when young negatively
in case σF < 1. The second term represents the positive wage effect. In the long run,
it holds that ∂kt+1
∂π
= ∂kt
∂π
= ∂k∞
∂π
and we can write:
∂c
y,F∞
∂π
= 1
αF
[
βFf ′′(k) − kf ′′(k)]∂k∞
∂π
(24)
which is positive as long as βF < k, implying that σF should not be extremely low
so that the positive wage effect dominates the negative interest rate effect in case
σF < 1. Simulations show that for realistic parameter values βF < k. In case of a
logarithmic utility function σF = 1 and βF = 0, so that only the wage effect occurs
and young-age consumption always rises.
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Result 2b: Change in old-age consumption Linearizing the second-period budget
constraint gives:
∂c
o,F
t+1
∂π
= (αF − 1)(1 + r)∂c
y,F
t
∂π
+ c
o,F f ′′(k)
(1 + r)σF
∂kt+1
∂π
(25)
Substituting the previous equation and (23) and noting that ∂kt+1
∂π
= ∂kt
∂π
= ∂k∞
∂π
gives
the long-run change of old-age consumption:
∂c
o,F∞
∂π
=
[
(αF − 1)(1 + r)
αF
(βF − k) + s
F
σF
]
f ′′(k)∂k∞
∂π
(26)
The first term between the brackets shows the positive effect of higher savings,
the second term shows the negative effects of the lower interest rate. As ∂k∞
∂π
> 0
and f ′′(k) < 0, ∂c
o,F∞
∂π
< 0 if (1+r)σ
F (αF −1)(k−βF )
αF
< sF . Simulations show that this
condition holds for realistic parameter values. Note that this condition reduces to
k(1+r)
2+ρ < s
F in case of logarithmic utility. In that case, simulations show that the
condition does not hold in case the production elasticity of capital is relatively large
(≥0.5).
Result 3: Change in utility Linearisation of the lifetime utility function and substi-
tution of the first-order condition gives:
∂UFt
∂π
= u′(cy,F )f ′′(k)
[
−k kt
∂π
+ s
F
1 + r
∂kt+1
∂π
]
(27)
Using that in the long run ∂kt+1
∂π
= ∂kt
∂π
= ∂k∞
∂π
, it follows that
∂UF∞
∂π
= u
′(cy,F )f ′′(k)
1 + r
[
sF − k(1 + r)]∂k∞
∂π
(28)
which is positive if sF < k(1 + r). A rise in the capital–labor ratio has two opposing
effects on the utility of individuals living in the funded country:
1. Country F is a lender in the international capital market, which means that sF >
k(1 + n). This implies that the lower interest rate that results for a higher capital–
labor ratio hurts people living in the funded country.
2. A lower interest rate also implies, however, that the economy is closer to the
Golden Rule point (r = n), which has positive utility effects in case of dynamic
efficiency (r > n).
If sF > k(1+r), the first effect dominates the second, implying that an increase in the
capital-labour ratio affects utility negatively. On the other hand, when sF < k(1 + r),
the second effect dominates the first and a higher capital–labor ratio leads to a higher
utility in the funded country.
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Fig. 13 sF − k(1 + r)
In Fig. 13, we present a graph that shows how the sign of sF − k(1 + r) (vertical
axis) changes for different parameter values.29 The horizontal axis shows the depre-
ciation rate (δ). This graph shows that sF − k(1 + r) < 0 for various values of the
parameters, which means that the Golden Rule effect dominates the interest rate ef-
fect. This in turn implies that for realistic parameter values, a rise in the capital–labor
ratio has positive utility effects in the funded country.30
For t = 0, we can substitute the difference equation for the capital stock, (20),
in (27), and use the fact that k−1
∂π
= 0 to find:
∂UF0
∂π
= u′(cy,F )f ′′(k)
[
−k + s
F
1 + r
(
1 + (αP − 1)(1 + r)
+ [
1
αP
− 1 + ν( 1
αF
− 1)]kf ′′(k)
Δ
)]
k0
∂π
(29)
Utility of people living in the funded country born at the time of the reform (t = 0)
falls as long as sF > (1+r)k
αP (1+r)−r+
[ 1
αP
−1+ν( 1
αF
−1)]kf ′′(k)
Δ
(< (1+r)k). This condition holds
as long as the production elasticity of capital is not too large (≤0.5).
29In the standard case, we have the following parameter values: ρ = 0.4303, τPw = 0.2, ν = 1, σ i = 1,
i = P,F and f (kt ) = kγt where γ = 0.3.
30It is actually possible to have sF −k(1+ r) > 0. This is the case, for example, when ρ = 0 and δ > 0.87.
A time preference rate of zero is not very realistic, however. Therefore, we conclude that for realistic
parameter values, it holds that sF − k(1 + r) < 0.
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Appendix B
B.1 Tax levied on the future old
With government debt, linearizing the capital-accumulation equation (9) with respect
to π around the initial steady state gives:
∂sPt
∂π
+ ν ∂s
F
t
∂π
= (1 + ν)∂kt+1
∂π
+ ∂bt+1
∂π
(30)
From this, we can derive the following first-order difference equation for the change
in the capital–labor ratio in case of different pension schemes:
∂kPFt+1
∂π
= [
1
αP
− 1 + ν( 1
αF
− 1)]kf ′′(k)
Δ
∂kPFt
∂π
+
(
1
αP
− 1
)
τP gt
Δ
− 1
αP Δ(1 + r)
(
τP ft+1 −
∂τBt+1
∂π
)
− 1
Δ
∂bPt+1
∂π
(31)
where Δ has the same definition as in Sect. 3.1. Comparing this equation with (12),
we see that there are two extra terms, ∂b
P
t+1
∂π
and ∂τ
B
t+1
∂π
because of the government debt
created to compensate the old at t = 0. As can be seen, debt has a direct negative
impact on the change in the capital–labor ratio. However, because τBt is levied on the
pensioners, they will increase their savings when young which has a positive effect
on the capital–labor ratio. Below, we show formally that savings increase exactly by
the same amount as the government debt, so that the capital–labor stays constant with
this pension reform scenario:
Proof Result 4 At t = 0, we have that ∂τP0
∂π
= τP g0, ∂z
P
0
∂π
= 0. Then using (4), we
know that ∂b
P
1
∂π
= − ∂τP0
∂π
= −τP g0 and ∂τ
B
1
∂π
= r ∂bP1
∂π
. So, that we can write ∂k
PF
1
∂π
=
( 1
αP
− 1)) τP
Δ
g0 − 1αP Δ(1+r) (τP f1 + rτP g0)+ τ
P g0
Δ
. Noting that f1 = g0, it is easy to
verify that ∂k
PF
1
∂π
= 0. And when this is the case for t = 1, this holds for all following
periods. 
B.2 Tax levied on the future young
In this case, the first-order difference equation for kt is:
∂kPFt+1
∂π
= [
1
αP
− 1 + ν( 1
αF
− 1)]kf ′′(k)
Δ
∂kPFt
∂π
+
(
1
αP
− 1
)
τP gt + ∂τ
B
t
∂π
Δ
− 1
αP Δ(1 + r)τ
P ft+1 − 1
Δ
∂bPt+1
∂π
(32)
As can be seen this equation looks almost the same as (31), the only difference is that
now τBt has a negative impact on the change in the capital–labor ratio.
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Proof Result 5 The change in the capital–labor ratio at t = 1 is ∂kPF1
∂π
= (
1
αP
−1)τP
Δ
g0 −
τP
αP Δ(1+r)f1 + 1ΔτP g0. This equation can be simplified to
∂kPF1
∂π
= τP r
ΔαP (1+r)g0 < 0.
So, we know that as soon τBt is levied on the future young, the capital–labor ratio
decreases at t = 1. 
Appendix C
Proof Result 7 Using (14), we know that the change in government debt at t = 1
is equal to ∂b
P
1
∂π
= −(1 − 2τP ) ∂τP0
∂π
= −(1 − 2τP )τP g0. Moreover, from t = 1 on-
ward, we have that ∂z
P
t
∂π
= (1 − 2τP ) ∂τPt
∂π
, implying that f1 = (1 − 2τP )g0, where
we used the fact that g1 = g0. Then noting that the capital-accumulation equation
looks the same as (31) gives ∂k
PF
1
∂π
= ( 1
αP
− 1) τP
Δ
g0 − 1αP Δ(1+r) [(1 − 2τP )τP g0 +
r(1−2τP )τP g0]+ 1Δ(1−2τP )τP g0, which can be written as
∂kPF1
∂π
= 2(τP )2(1−αP )
αP Δ
g0
> 0. 
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